The op-ed “Unfulfilled Promises, Unstable Peace” (see here) presents a one-sided narrative that overlooks critical historical, legal, and geopolitical realities surrounding Western Tigray. While it correctly identifies some failures in implementing the Pretoria Agreement, its core argument—that the federal government is deliberately enabling Amhara “annexation” while allowing the TPLF to exploit grievances—is flawed in three key ways: it ignores historical context, misrepresents constitutional and legal realities, and oversimplifies Ethiopia’s current security dilemmas.
The article frames Western Tigray (Welkait, Humera, Tsegede) as indisputably Tigrayan territory, ignoring decades of contested governance. Before the TPLF-dominated EPRDF redrew boundaries in the 1990s, these areas were administered under Begemder province, with a mixed Amhara-Tigrayan population. The claim that Amhara forces “illegally annexed” the region disregards longstanding Amhara grievances over what they see as a TPLF-imposed boundary. While the 1995 constitution placed the area under Tigray, this decision was never fully accepted by Amhara nationalists. The article’s dismissal of these historical disputes undermines its credibility.
The author insists that the federal government must enforce the constitution by restoring Tigray’s pre-war control, but this ignores Ethiopia’s post-war realities. The Pretoria Agreement did not explicitly mandate an immediate return to pre-2020 boundaries; instead, it called for a constitutional resolution of disputes. Given the mass displacement, alleged war crimes, and ongoing insurgencies (including the Fano rebellion in Amhara), a forced handover to Tigray would trigger further violence. The article’s demand for an unconditional Tigrayan return disregards the security vacuum and risks inflaming Amhara militancy.
The op-ed accuses the federal government of “deliberate inaction” to weaken Tigray, but this ignores broader instability. Since 2023, the government has been fighting the Fano insurgency, which opposes any concessions to Tigray. Simultaneously, Eritrea’s lingering presence complicates demilitarization. The author’s suggestion that Addis Ababa could easily expel Amhara forces or Eritrean troops underestimates Ethiopia’s current security landscape.
The article’s argument hinges on a simplistic moral binary—pitting Tigrayan victimhood against federal and Amhara villainy—while ignoring the complex trade-offs required for lasting peace. Yes, the Pretoria Agreement should be fully implemented, but this requires negotiation, not unilateral enforcement. A sustainable solution must address Amhara grievances, guarantee security for returning IDPs, and prevent further conflict—not just echo TPLF-era territorial maximalism.
The path forward is not through polemics (ለተቀማጭሰማይ ቅርቡ ነው) but inclusive dialogue, constitutional reforms, and phased returns that balance all stakeholders concerns. The author’s failure to acknowledge this reality weakens his case.