The Double Bind: Navigating Eritrea’s Silence and Incursions with Strategic Clarity

The Double Bind: Navigating Eritrea’s Silence and Incursions with Strategic Clarity

 

A letter rests, its contents a quiet plea for reason. Across a sealed border, the dust rises from armored columns and the muffled thunder of distant artillery. This is the stark duality Ethiopia now faces: a formal, peaceful overture for sovereign sea access lies unanswered in Asmara, while Eritrean forces maneuver inside our sovereign territory, from the expanses of Northern Ethiopia to the troubled lands of Amhara, even conspiring in brutal attacks alongside Tigrayan militants in Tselemti. We are caught in a double bind—one hand extended in peace, the other forced to parry a dagger in the dark. In this moment of profound tension, the simplistic cry for war is a seductive poison. It offers the catharsis of action but promises only mutual ruin. Instead, Ethiopia must pursue a path of immense discipline: a dual-track strategy of principled persistence and defensive deterrence, rigorously separating the existential economic question from the immediate security threat, while mastering how they inform a single, sober national purpose.

The diplomatic track begins with understanding that Asmara’s silence is not a full stop, but a semicolon in a long, difficult narrative. Eritrea’s regime is psychologically and politically wired for perceived siege. An outright, gracious acceptance of our proposal for talks on Assab and maritime access was always unlikely. Their non-response is a tactical move, designed to preserve maximal bargaining power and assess our resolve. Therefore, our foreign ministry must not see a closed door, but initiate a sustained, multi-layered diplomatic campaign. First, we must formalize and elevate the proposal. By carefully publicizing its core principles—a commitment to legally binding, mutually beneficial agreements on port leases, fees, and shared infrastructure—we accomplish two critical goals. We demonstrate transparent, peaceful intent to Africa and the world, seizing the moral high ground, and we place subtle but significant pressure on Eritrea’s isolated government. The international community, weary of Horn of Africa conflicts, must see Ethiopia as the pragmatic actor seeking economic solutions, not military adventures.

Simultaneously, we must activate every channel. “Track 1.5” diplomacy, using respected former statesmen and trusted regional intermediaries, can probe Asmara’s unstated fears and red lines. Concurrently, we must internationalize the issue not as a grievance, but as a legitimate imperative. To the AU, UN, and key capitals from Washington to Beijing, Abu Dhabi to Ankara, our message must be clear: a landlocked nation of 120 million seeks a peaceful, commercial resolution to a fundamental economic bottleneck. This is not a revanchist claim, but a plea for stability through integration. Crucially, we must accelerate and loudly champion our alternatives. Every progress on the Berbera corridor, every efficiency gain in Djibouti, every study on Lamu must be heralded. We must show, through action and announcement, that Ethiopia’s development is unstoppable. The goal is to make Eritrea’s intransigence a costly miscalculation for them—to transform Assab from a weapon they withhold into an opportunity they are missing.

Yet, diplomacy cannot be blind to the tanks on the ground. The incursions in the north are a blatant violation of sovereignty and the spirit of the Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. They require a firm, unequivocal response—but one calibrated to de-escalate, not provoke a wider war. War is not an option; it is a failure of statecraft that would cataclysmically set back both nations for generations. Instead, our response must be a model of integrated deterrence.

The immediate step is a formal, detailed dossier to the UN Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council. We must document the presence of Eritrean Defense Forces in our regions, their joint operations with Tigrayan militants, and the resultant instability. This is not “whining”; it is holding a regime accountable before the institutions of global order. We must demand emergency sessions of IGAD and the AU. The framing is vital: this is not about sea access. It is about a neighbor violating international law and undermining regional peace. We separate the issues to isolate Eritrea’s aggression.

Militarily, our posture must be defensively robust. Reinforcements to the ENDF in affected areas should be framed and deployed as protective shields—consolidating positions, securing populations, and denying further advance. The message is one of steadfast defense, not preparation for invasion. Alongside this, we must wage a form of strategic political warfare. We should support—quietly but consistently—the increasing international scrutiny of Eritrea’s domestic horrors: the indefinite national service, the suffocated press, the systemic human rights abuses. By aligning with global calls for reform, we raise the regime’s cost of isolation and sharpen the contrast between Ethiopia’s difficult but open path and Eritrea’s hermetic tyranny.

The long-term genius of this strategy lies in the careful, almost imperceptible, linkage of these two tracks. We never publicly threaten to take Assab by force. Instead, through private, high-level channels, a simple, irrefutable logic can be conveyed: A de-escalation along our shared border and a withdrawal to recognized lines would naturally create the conducive atmosphere for the transformative economic partnership we have proposed. Your current path of aggression only guarantees your continued isolation and our accelerated pursuit of alternatives. We make peace the profitable option.

This is the essence of outmaneuvering, rather than outfighting. The Asmara regime’s currency is perpetual crisis. We must refuse to be its source. By relentlessly pursuing peaceful port diversification, we undercut their leverage. By responding to incursions with multilateral legal and diplomatic pressure, we deny them the bilateral clash that justifies their militarization. By keeping the door to Assab open, we appeal to the Eritrean people’s future longing for normalcy and prosperity, over their leader’s present addiction to conflict

The road ahead requires strategic patience of a kind that tests the soul of a nation. It is infuriating to offer peace while being stabbed. Yet, the greater victory lies in making Eritrea’s aggression and isolation unsustainable, while Ethiopia marches forward, connected, developing, and unwavering in its defense. Our extended hand must remain steady, even as the shield in our other is tested. The goal is not the ephemeral blaze of war, but the enduring dawn of secured sovereignty and achieved destiny. We must be the calm, resolved, and indefatigable power that history needs us to be.

Notes

On Ethiopia's Foreign Investment Landscape

Ethiopia’s foreign investment landscape is dominated by a mix of countries, with **China** leading significantly, followed by key players from the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. Here’s a breakdown of the top investors and their sectors:

### Top Foreign Investors:

1. **China**:  

   – **Dominant Sector**: Infrastructure (roads, railways, industrial parks), manufacturing, and energy.  

   – **Examples**: Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway, Eastern Industrial Zone, hydropower projects.  

   – **Why**: Strategic BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) partnerships and government-backed loans.

2. **Saudi Arabia & UAE**:  

   – **Dominant Sector**: Agriculture (land leases for food security), logistics, ports, and hospitality.  

   – **Examples**: UAE’s AD Ports Group operating Somaliland’s Berbera Corridor linked to Ethiopia; Saudi Star Agricultural Development.  

   – **Why**: Geopolitical interests in Horn of Africa stability and resource access.

3. **Turkey**:  

   – **Dominant Sector**: Textiles, manufacturing, and hospitality.  

   – **Examples**: Major industrial zones in Hawassa and Dire Dawa; investments by companies like Ayka Textiles.  

4. **India**:  

   – **Dominant Sector**: Agriculture, manufacturing (pharmaceuticals, textiles), and services.  

   – **Examples**: Investments by companies like Karuturi Global (agribusiness, though scaled back) and Birla Group.  

5. **United States & Europe**:  

   – **Key Players**: Netherlands (floriculture, renewables), UK (consumer goods), Germany (engineering), and USA (aviation, tech).  

   – **Examples**: Heineken (Brewery), Diageo (beverages), Siemens, and Boeing.  

### Other Notable Investors:

– **Egypt & Sudan**: Focused on agriculture and cross-border trade.  

– **South Korea**: Manufacturing and textiles (e.g., shoe factories in Addis).  

– **Development Finance Institutions (DFIs)**: IFC (World Bank), CDC Group (UK), and Proparco (France) fund private-sector projects.

### Key Trends & Context:

– **Shift Post-2018**: Gulf investments surged after Ethiopia’s political reforms, targeting ports (e.g., UAE’s stake in Berbera) and agriculture.  

– **Manufacturing Focus**: Ethiopia’s industrial parks (Bole Lemi, Hawassa) attract textile/footwear giants (PVH, H&M suppliers).  

– **Challenges**: Currency shortages, bureaucratic hurdles, and recent conflict (2020–2022) slowed some investments.  

– **New Opportunities**: Telecom liberalization (Safaricom consortium) and renewable energy (geothermal, wind).  

### Data Sources (Vary by Year):

– **Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC)**: Lists China, India, Turkey as top sources by project numbers.  

– **Capital Flow**: Gulf states lead in high-value deals (e.g., UAE’s $1.6B telecom license in 2024).  

**In summary**, **China** remains Ethiopia’s largest investor in infrastructure and industry, while **Gulf nations (UAE/Saudi)** drive strategic agribusiness and port investments. Diversification is growing, with Turkey, India, and European firms expanding manufacturing footprints.

A review

Building a Durable Accommodation with Eritrea

Addissu Admas’ article (read here), “Building a Durable Accommodation with Eritrea,” presents a compelling and urgent argument for diplomatic negotiations between Ethiopia and Eritrea over access to the Red Sea. The strength of this piece lies in its historical depth, logical reasoning, and pragmatic approach to a contentious geopolitical issue that threatens regional stability
 
 The author meticulously traces the colonial origins of Eritrea’s coastline, highlighting how arbitrary borders imposed by Italy have left Ethiopia landlocked. This framing is crucial because it underscores that Ethiopia’s demand is not expansionist but rooted in historical continuity, economic necessity, and sovereign rights.
 
Admas firmly opposes war as a solution, recognizing that conflict would be catastrophic for both nations. Instead, he advocates for negotiation under international mediation (UN/AU), which demonstrates a rational and ethical stance. His comparison to the Danzig Corridor is particularly insightful, offering a historical precedent for peaceful territorial accommodations.
 
The article convincingly argues that Eritrea stands to gain economically from leasing Assab to Ethiopia, given Djibouti’s current dominance in handling Ethiopian trade. The proposal is not one-sided but suggests mutual benefits—something Eritrea’s leadership should consider if economic growth is a priority.
 
The author rightly points out the injustice of a nation of 120+ million people being held hostage by Eritrea’s refusal to negotiate. Ethiopia’s security concerns, particularly regarding naval defense, are legitimate in an era of increasing Red Sea militarization (e.g., UAE, Turkey, and Saudi bases in the region).
 
While the article is persuasive, it could address Eritrea’s perspective more thoroughly. President Isaias Afwerki’s regime thrives on isolationism and distrust of Ethiopia, shaped by decades of war. A durable solution must also consider Eritrea’s security paranoia—how can Ethiopia assure Asmara that leased territory won’t become a Trojan horse?
 
Additionally, the Somaliland MoU reference is risky—Eritrea may view this as Ethiopia’s “expansionist blueprint,” undermining trust. Instead, the focus should be on exclusive economic incentives, such as joint port management, infrastructure investments, or even shared naval facilities under AU oversight.
 
The final verdict …a  Necessary Call for Diplomacy
 
Admas’ article is a timely, well-reasoned appeal to avoid another catastrophic Horn of Africa war. His arguments are rooted in historical fairness, economic logic, and strategic necessity, making a strong case for why Eritrea must come to the table. However, success will require confidence-building measures, international guarantees, and creative compromises—not just historical analogies.
 
The alternative—continued stalemate—only fuels instability. As the Red Sea becomes a global flashpoint, Ethiopia cannot afford indefinite dependency on Djibouti, and Eritrea cannot afford perpetual hostility with its largest neighbor. Negotiation is not a choice; it is an inevitability. The only question is whether both nations will act before or after another avoidable war.

A review

The op-ed “Unfulfilled Promises, Unstable Peace” (see here) presents a one-sided narrative that overlooks critical historical, legal, and geopolitical realities surrounding Western Tigray. While it correctly identifies some failures in implementing the Pretoria Agreement, its core argument—that the federal government is deliberately enabling Amhara “annexation” while allowing the TPLF to exploit grievances—is flawed in three key ways: it ignores historical context, misrepresents constitutional and legal realities, and oversimplifies Ethiopia’s current security dilemmas.

The article frames Western Tigray (Welkait, Humera, Tsegede) as indisputably Tigrayan territory, ignoring decades of contested governance. Before the TPLF-dominated EPRDF redrew boundaries in the 1990s, these areas were administered under Begemder province, with a mixed Amhara-Tigrayan population. The claim that Amhara forces “illegally annexed” the region disregards longstanding Amhara grievances over what they see as a TPLF-imposed boundary. While the 1995 constitution placed the area under Tigray, this decision was never fully accepted by Amhara nationalists. The article’s dismissal of these historical disputes undermines its credibility.

The author insists that the federal government must enforce the constitution by restoring Tigray’s pre-war control, but this ignores Ethiopia’s post-war realities. The Pretoria Agreement did not explicitly mandate an immediate return to pre-2020 boundaries; instead, it called for a constitutional resolution of disputes. Given the mass displacement, alleged war crimes, and ongoing insurgencies (including the Fano rebellion in Amhara), a forced handover to Tigray would trigger further violence. The article’s demand for an unconditional Tigrayan return disregards the security vacuum and risks inflaming Amhara militancy.

The op-ed accuses the federal government of “deliberate inaction” to weaken Tigray, but this ignores broader instability. Since 2023, the government has been fighting the Fano insurgency, which opposes any concessions to Tigray. Simultaneously, Eritrea’s lingering presence complicates demilitarization. The author’s suggestion that Addis Ababa could easily expel Amhara forces or Eritrean troops underestimates Ethiopia’s current  security landscape.

The article’s argument hinges on a simplistic moral binary—pitting Tigrayan victimhood against federal and Amhara villainy—while ignoring the complex trade-offs required for lasting peace. Yes, the Pretoria Agreement should be fully implemented, but this requires negotiation, not unilateral enforcement. A sustainable solution must address Amhara grievances, guarantee security for returning IDPs, and prevent further conflict—not just echo TPLF-era territorial maximalism.

The path forward is not through polemics (ለተቀማጭሰማይ ቅርቡ ነው)  but inclusive dialogue, constitutional reforms, and phased returns that balance all stakeholders concerns. The author’s failure to acknowledge this reality weakens his case.

A review

The Weaknesses of an Unbalanced Critique of Abiy Ahmed’s Leadership

Comment on this article by  Emedo Farda July 11, 2025 At 11:59 am

The argument that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed relies solely on war and instability to maintain power suffers from several weaknesses, undermining its credibility as a balanced assessment. First, it presents an overly deterministic view of Abiy’s motives, reducing complex political decisions to mere distractions from domestic crises. While conflict has been a recurring feature of his leadership, other factors—such as regional security dynamics, internal factionalism, or a genuine belief in Ethiopian unity—may also shape his policies. Additionally, Ethiopia’s landlocked status and economic reliance on port access provide legitimate strategic motivations for his Red Sea rhetoric, rather than merely being a diversionary tactic.
Tthe comparison to Saddam Hussein is hyperbolic and lacks nuance. Unlike Saddam’s outright invasion of Kuwait, Abiy’s statements on sea access have been framed as negotiable, not as a declaration of war. Historical analogies can be useful, but without clear evidence of expansionist intent, such parallels risk being misleading.
The assumption that war with Eritrea is inevitable is speculative. Despite tensions, Ethiopia and Eritrea have a complex relationship, alternating between conflict and cooperation. Claims that Abiy is actively seeking a pretext for invasion require more concrete evidence than rhetorical posturing.
Moreover, the critique omits counterarguments, such as Abiy’s early reforms, mediation efforts in Sudan, or negotiations with international financial institutions. A fair analysis should acknowledge these complexities rather than attributing every crisis to deliberate malfeasance.
Finally, while advocating for nonviolent resistance is commendable, the argument oversimplifies Ethiopia’s political landscape. State repression, ethnic fragmentation, and limited civic space make mass mobilization extremely difficult, a challenge understated in the critique.
While the argument raises valid concerns, its one-sided, conspiratorial framing weakens its persuasiveness. A balanced assessment must consider structural challenges, alternative explanations, and the broader context of Ethiopian politics—rather than reducing everything to Abiy’s supposed manipulation