Untitled

Ethiopianess

It is translated from Amharic and  written by the late Ato Gabru Gebrewold on  Wahed, a publication of the Amde Hibret organization on May 22, 1998.

by Emedo Farda

At this time, out of all the complicated problems in which our country finds itself, which one is the fundamental one that must be given priority? Without any doubt, it is the question of Ethiopianness and the unity of the country. As is known, political forces have used “Ethiopianness” as one tool for their own political purposes. In Ethiopia, they have historically abused/misused and distorted the identities and rights of nations, nationalities, and peoples for their own benefit. Likewise, the concept of “Ethiopianness” has, in the same way, been used by political forces as a tool to abuse and distort the historical rights of nations, nationalities, and peoples.

If our understanding of Ethiopianness is not the same, similar, or close — then our belief/outlook regarding the unity and future prospects of our country will likewise be different and far apart (equally divergent).If, on the other hand, our understanding of Ethiopianness can align and merge into a shared one — then our belief regarding the unity and future prospects of our country, and our ultimate goal, will likewise be close/aligned.

To repeat this in unambiguous terms: if our understanding of Ethiopianness is fundamentally incompatible, then our stance on national unity likewise cannot be reconciled — and even action itself becomes unworkable. A fundamental difference in perspective will lead to a fundamental difference in action and goals.

Up to now, had all political groups’ understanding of Ethiopianness and national unity been close and fed into one another, we would not have gone to bitter wars, again and again. Because of this irreconcilable understanding and interpretation of national unity, the blood of thousands of people was spilled — in the places where they lived, and in the fields. And, from time to time, numerous organized and armed bands and organizations would not have proliferated and spread as they did.

At this time, the question of Ethiopianness and national unity is not one that gathers us together and brings us to a shared, clear, and shining common understanding. What is clear and prominent on the question of Ethiopianness and national unity are instead divergent kinds and levels of viewpoints. As mentioned above, where this difference is not resolved peacefully, it leads to the raising of armies, and on to war and bloodshed.

The difference will widen rather than narrow, and everyone knows that these wars become meaner, not weaker — they don’t stop or come to an end. For anyone who cannot discern this reality, or who denies it, one need only look at United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) in the Ethiopian election in 2005, a multinational organization and the political stances of nationality/ethnic-group (የብሔር/ብሔረሰብ) movements such as the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Oromo Liberation Front.

If our question of Ethiopianness and Ethiopian unity gives rise to such fierce arguments and destruction, then this is the problem that must be addressed and understood before any other question. Before taking up any political question or seeking its solution, this question must come first. Of all political questions, it is imperative that discussion of this one comes to the forefront. Seeking answers and solutions to this question is necessary — it is the burning question of our time.

If we do not deny that divisions exist on the question of the country’s unity and Ethiopianness, then to think, believe, and simply repeat that “unity” and “Ethiopianness” alone will solve the problem is a grave mistake — and one that will only lead to further grave mistakes. It is clear this approach cannot stop our separations and divisions. In fact, far from stopping them, it will aggravate the problem. It will prevent us from finding the correct answers and will drag us backward.

Over time, our question of Ethiopianness and unity has clearly become more visible, and has moved to the center of heated discussion and controversy. Failing to give it the focus and weight it deserves is itself a misjudgment that can lead to grave mistakes. To deny and hide the problem only makes it worse — it does not solve it. As the saying goes, “For an illness that is hidden, no medicine can be found.” Correctly identifying and understanding the nature of the problem is what points us toward the right solution — and brings us closer to it.

Otherwise, the effort to search for answers will be in vain — like feeling around in the dark. It will take us back to where we started, stepping in place again and again: like a guinea fowl that stays the night and is still a guinea fowl; like a calf that, even after a year, is still a calf; like something washed clean that is still mud. In this same way, treating the questions of “Ethiopianness” and “national unity” as questions that should not even be dreamed of or thought about — as unacceptable and unwelcome — is a view that should and must be rejected. To declare “listen only to what I/we say, and accept it” cannot be a solution to the problem. It is like relying on miracles or witchcraft — it will not work. This is the nature of the ignorant and of the dictator, and it must be abandoned.

In fact, it may be inherited from the feudal system and its feudal lords, and from dictatorship — its orders, commands, and habits of ruling through terror may be the more accurate way to describe it. This includes both the feudal system’s inclinations and the nostalgic yearning for the Derg’s system of repression — habits that devalue and reject democratic discussion, and that show no respect for equality. This reflects an irreconcilable contradiction between democratic and feudal approaches to problem-solving. It is an irreconcilable contradiction between the feudal and democratic systems — a clear reflection of that same underlying, irreconcilable contradiction.

In other words, should the question of Ethiopianness and our unity be approached and resolved by feudal methods or democratic ones? By decree and command, or through open discussion? By opening up the question, examining it, and weighing it carefully — or by the way of “a sycamore fig grown in silence,” “let it cook while covered,” “its inside belongs only to the priest,” “do not investigate, do not discuss” — following, instead, the road of darkness?

For those who do not wish to travel the road of “camel urine,” or the “days of stone bread” — the answer is clear. The question of Ethiopianness and national unity must be approached and resolved through democratic discussion and method.

Be that as it may, to answer the question — where do we want to start, and what should we do? By whom, and by what standard, will the correctness of the solution be measured? The answer to these questions, and their solutions, can be found only from the standpoint of the fundamental rights and enduring interests of all peoples. The correctness of the answer and the solution is confirmed only when it is found to unite the people as one, through their agreement and mutual binding. This is not something achieved by being forced to live under one country and one government, but only through the agreement of all peoples and their genuine desire to build unity. Ethiopia, as a country, will endure only if its people’s unity is found to be harmonized — fitted together — as one.

The meaning and interpretation given to our Ethiopianness and our country’s unity must be grounded in the belief and acceptance of all the peoples of Ethiopia. [Only then can] all of Ethiopia’s peoples feel that unity and Ethiopianness equally and in the same way.

Be that as it may, in order to correctly answer the question of unity and Ethiopianness, it becomes necessary to ask another question as well — a required one. We must ask: what kind of unity, and whose unity? What kind of Ethiopianess, and whose Ethiopianness?

As such, this is where we part ways with those who cover it up, those who obscure and blur the question, and those who dress it up and treat it as a settled whole. When they speak of Ethiopianness in a vague, blanket, wholesale way, and say “Let Ethiopia come first” — we say instead: the definition and meaning of Ethiopianness, and the historical substance and content of unity — and what that actually consists of — must come first.

When they say “Ethiopianness and the unity of the country,” and when  we say “Ethiopianness and the unity of the country,” we want our difference to be properly and clearly known. We want to leave the judgment and the choice to those to whom the problem truly belongs — the people of our country.

Before we proceed to answer the question, perhaps to find the clue and trail toward that answer, we want to ask a question that can help guide us. And that is: the question of our country’s unity and Ethiopianness — particularly over the past 30 years — why did it become such a burning question during this period? To pose the question in relation to the historic, decisive period of the 1974 revolution (1966 in the Ethiopian calendar): Ethiopianness and national unity have continued to remain a burning question since then — so why was Ethiopianness and national unity not raised as a political problem in 1974 (1966 E.C.)? To ask the same question again: why did our question of unity and Ethiopianness continue to be a burning issue, yet was not presented boldly and widely as a problem following the 1974 (1966 E.C.) revolution? Up until that period, what was the historical substance/content of Ethiopianness?

Notes On Ethiopia’s Economy Improvement

Notes On Ethiopia’s Economy Improvement

Monday June 9,2026

Ethiopia is the birthplace of coffee — one of the world’s most traded commodities. Yet the farmers who grow it remain among the world’s poorest. The country earns billions in export revenue while millions go to bed hungry. This is not a mystery. It is a policy failure — one that can be corrected.”  if this statement is true, how can the government  create or improve the for faster, better economic results…consider these factors for improvement 1)policy failure 2)the fact Ethiopia is  a third world country 3)you won relevant input for improvementThis is a richly documented problem. Here’s a comprehensive, structured analysis and policy roadmap.

Ethiopia’s Coffee Paradox: From Policy Failure to Economic Transformation

The opening statement is largely accurate. Ethiopia is Africa’s largest coffee producer and the world’s fifth-largest exporter, and the sector generated over $2 billion in 2024/2025, accounting for roughly one-third of total merchandise export earnings. Yet Ethiopian coffee farmers receive one of the smallest shares of the export price compared to other major coffee-producing countries, with their incomes constrained by a complex value chain, poor market access, and liquidity challenges. The paradox is real. Here is how to fix it. 

I. THE CORE DIAGNOSIS: What Is Actually Broken?

Before solutions, the failures must be named clearly.

A. The Value Chain Robbery

The most fundamental problem is structural: farmers produce the raw material but capture almost none of the final value. Coffee contributes 30–35 percent of Ethiopia’s foreign exchange earnings and supports the livelihoods of more than 15 million people, most of them smallholder farmers — yet coffee powers 35% of export earnings but gets just 8% of bank credit. Farmers grow the beans; middlemen, exporters, and foreign roasters capture the margins. 

B. Structural Institutional Failures

The sector faces a fragmented institutional structure, limited stakeholder engagement, underdeveloped value chains, poor market linkages, and inadequate access to inputs and extension services. Government price-fixing compounds this: the Tea and Coffee Authority fixes the price at which washing stations buy coffee from farmers — a legacy from a nationalization scheme from a previous regime. This suppresses farmer income at the very first link in the chain. 

C. The Finance Gap

A $2.4 billion green finance gap is preventing farmers, processors, exporters, and traders from adopting climate-smart practices, meeting environmental standards, and protecting the country’s most valuable export. Without credit access, farmers cannot invest in better yields, better processing, or certifications that command premium prices. 

II. POLICY REFORM AGENDA

(Factor 1 — Correcting Policy Failures)

1. Break the Price-Fixing Regime The government-mandated farm-gate price floor does more harm than good. It should be replaced with a transparent, market-linked pricing system where farmers receive a guaranteed percentage — ideally 60–70% — of the FOB (free-on-board) export price. Rwanda and Colombia have models worth studying.

2. Reform the Export Licensing Monopoly The heavily regulated export licensing system concentrates power among a small group of exporters who profit from the information asymmetry between global prices and what they pay farmers. As of May 2025, the mandate for registering export coffee contracts has been transferred to ECTA, while issuance of export permits can now be processed by any commercial bank in Ethiopia — a promising reform that must be accelerated and deepened to include direct farmer-to-buyer digital trading. 

3. Redirect Export Revenue Back to the Sector A dedicated Coffee Development Levy — taxing 1–2% of export revenue — should be ringfenced to fund farmer extension services, cooperative infrastructure, and rural processing equipment. This is self-financing: better farms produce better coffee, which earns more export revenue.

4. Enforce and Expand the National Coffee Strategy The government’s Comprehensive Ethiopian Coffee Sector Improvement and Reform (CECSIR) strategy aims to quintuple farmers’ incomes to a target of $2.7 billion and create 2.7 million jobs by 2033. The strategy is ambitious and correct in direction — the failure is in implementation, financing, and accountability. It needs legally binding milestones, not aspirational targets. 

III. THIRD-WORLD CONTEXT SOLUTIONS (Factor 2 — Working Within Real Constraints)

Being a low-income country with limited state capacity does not mean doing nothing — it means sequencing interventions smartly.

1. Move Up the Value Chain — Process More at Home Ethiopia exports almost entirely raw or semi-processed green coffee. The highest margins are in roasting, grinding, and branding. About 25% of the total population of Ethiopia is dependent on production, processing, distribution, and export of coffee. If even 20% of that coffee were exported as roasted and packaged product, the income multiplier effect would be transformative. The government should offer tax holidays and equipment subsidies to domestic roasters targeting export markets. 

2. Build Cooperative Power Individual smallholder farmers have zero bargaining power. Cooperatives aggregate that power. Projects benefiting smallholder farmers through cooperatives and wet mills are addressing production and quality challenges with measurable results. The government should make cooperative registration simple, protect cooperatives from politically motivated interference, and give them direct access to export licenses. 

3. Mobile Finance and Digital Payments Ethiopia has a rapidly growing mobile money ecosystem (Telebirr). Paying farmers directly through mobile wallets, bypassing informal intermediary chains, can reduce payment delays, theft, and exploitation. This requires no advanced infrastructure — only policy mandate and partnerships with telecoms.

Leverage Diaspora Investment The Ethiopian diaspora — concentrated in the US, Europe, and the Gulf — represents billions in potential remittances and investment capital. A Coffee Diaspora Bond program, similar to Israel’s state bonds, could raise targeted financing for processing infrastructure while building emotional and economic ties to the homeland.

IV. ADDITIONAL HIGH-LEVERAGE INPUTS (Factor 3 — Strategic Opportunities)

1. Specialty Coffee Premiumization Demand for Ethiopian specialty coffee has increased and continues to grow, with higher quality status achieved by implementing the best agricultural practices in farming, harvesting, and processing methods, combined with elevated levels of quality control. The extra income generated by specialty coffee should be distributed throughout the supply chain, including coffee farmers. Yirgacheffe, Sidama, and Harrar are globally recognized terroir brands. Ethiopia should treat these the way France treats Champagne — with geographic indication (GI) protections and aggressive global marketing funded by the state. 

2. Protect Against the EU Deforestation Regulation In the most extreme scenario where exports to the EU cease completely, Ethiopia could face an 18.4% drop in overall exports, a 5.8% fall in imports, a 0.6% decrease in GDP, and a 3.3% reduction in public revenue. This is an existential threat. The government must fast-track a national digital traceability system so farmers can prove their coffee is deforestation-free — turning the compliance burden into a quality

3. Diversify Export Markets Over-dependence on European buyers creates vulnerability. Ethiopia’s main export partners include Saudi Arabia (15%), UAE (9.1%), Germany (6.9%), China (6.8%), and the Netherlands (6.7%). There is enormous untapped potential in China — the world’s fastest-growing coffee market — and in the African middle class. A state-backed marketing campaign targeting Asian markets specifically could be a game-changer.

4. Climate Resilience Investment Ethiopian coffee farmers are increasingly experiencing the adverse effects of climate change, with rising temperatures, unpredictable rainfall patterns, and extreme weather events altering the coffee-growing regions’ microclimates, making it difficult to sustain production. Shade-grown practices, drought-resistant varieties, and reforestation programs are not just environmental — they are economic survival strategies that need funding now. 

V. THE SEQUENCING PRIORITY

For the fastest results, the government should act in this order:

Immediate (0–12 months): Reform farm-gate pricing, expand mobile payment to farmers, accelerate digital traceability for EUDR compliance.

Medium-term (1–3 years): Scale cooperatives, build domestic roasting capacity, ring-fence a coffee development fund, launch specialty GI branding globally.

Long-term (3–10 years): Full value chain integration, domestic coffee brand presence in Asian markets, climate-adaptive farming standard across all growing regions.

The core insight is this: Ethiopia does not have a coffee problem. It has a capture problem — the value exists, but it is being extracted by intermediaries and foreign processors rather than retained by the people who grow the beans. Every policy lever described above points in one direction: close that gap.

The Pattern That Repeats: What Ethiopia’s Peace Brokers Keep Getting Wrong

OPINION  ·  ETHIOPIA

The Pattern That Repeats: What Ethiopia’s Peace Brokers Keep Getting Wrong  

Western diplomacy knows how to stop a war. It has less experience building what comes after.

May 4, 2026

There is a template. It has been used before. You bring the armed factions to the table, reduce the violence to a workable level, call the result progress, and move on. The American and British embassies in Addis Ababa are running it right now in Ethiopia — applying pressure to include Fano and OLA in negotiations while keeping the TPLF central, as the Pretoria framework demands. The diplomats are professional. The approach is coherent. And if history is any guide, it will produce calm for a while and crisis again later.

I. The Bosnian lesson

In November 1995, Richard Holbrooke brokered the Dayton Accords and ended the Bosnian War. It was a genuine achievement — at minimum, it stopped the killing. But Dayton was, as analysts at the Wilson Center later put it, more a truce than a settlement. The agreement froze the warring parties in place, rewarded ethnic control of territory, and created governing architecture so elaborate that it gave Bosnian leaders no real incentive to negotiate the underlying causes of the conflict themselves. Thirty years on, Bosnia has three de facto mono-ethnic entities, a political system that depends on international supervision to function, and recurring crises that the original agreement was never designed to resolve.

The parallel to Ethiopia is not perfect — no parallel ever is — but it is uncomfortable. The Pretoria Agreement of November 2022 ended the Tigray War. It was necessary, and it was right to pursue it. But it sidelined the Amhara militias who had fought alongside the federal government, left the contested territories of Western and Southern Tigray unresolved, and set up a disarmament process the TPLF resisted almost from the start. Within two years, Fano had launched a full insurgency in Amhara, the OLA remained active across Oromia, and by April 2026, the TPLF had reinstated its own regional government, accusing Addis Ababa of violating the very agreement that was supposed to end the conflict.

“The agreement stopped the shooting. It did not settle the argument.”

This is what happens when a peace process is optimized for cessation rather than resolution. The shooting stops. The argument does not.

II. The ground the diplomats don’t see

The problem is not that Western diplomats are wrong about the need for negotiation. The problem is that the Ethiopia they are negotiating about is considerably more complicated than the framework they are applying to it.

Fano is not a single actor. It is a constellation of autonomous militias — Gondar Fano, Wollo Fano, Shewa Fano, the Amhara People’s Fano Front — with different command structures, different territorial interests, and different relationships with external actors including, according to multiple reports, the TPLF and Eritrea. When the U.S. Embassy holds discussions with “the Fano,” it is mostly talking to whichever faction is willing to show up. In early 2025, the only confirmed meeting was with the Amhara People’s Fano Front, whose own leader acknowledged that disunity was weakening the movement. Meanwhile, at least one other Fano leader publicly rejected any suggestion of negotiation as premature.

The OLA presents a different set of complications. Its fragmentation is also real — a breakaway faction signed a peace deal with the Oromia regional government in December 2024, leading to a meaningful drop in violence in parts of the region. But that decline has proved partial and fragile: sporadic attacks on civilians continued in the weeks that followed, and it remains unclear whether the agreement reflects genuine political transformation or a tactical pause by part of an organization that is itself divided on strategy.

What the numbers show

In Amhara, from December 2024 to January 2025, ACLED recorded 21 civilian targeting events — 48% attributed to Ethiopian federal forces. The conflict is not simply government versus armed groups. Civilians are being harmed by both sides, in a context where Fano controls parts of  rural Amhara while the federal army holds the cities and transport routes and other areas.

These distinctions matter enormously for what negotiation can actually accomplish. A deal signed with one Fano faction means nothing to the others. A ceasefire in Oromia that excludes the OLA factions still aligned with the TPLF creates gaps that violence rushes to fill. Flattening these actors into a single category of “armed groups to be brought to the table” is not diplomacy. It is category error dressed in diplomatic language.

III. What an alternative might look like

Here is where critics of managed peace most often go quiet. It is easier to diagnose the problem than to propose a different approach, partly because any alternative is harder and carries more risk. But the silence itself becomes a form of abdication. So let us try.

First, disaggregate before you negotiate. The U.S. and British embassies should resist the temptation to treat each armed movement as a single interlocutor. That means investing in mapping — not just which factions exist, but what each faction actually wants, who it answers to, and what would need to be true for its grievances to be addressed structurally. Some Fano factions want federal recognition of Amhara territorial claims in Welkite Tsegede. Others are fighting for regional autonomy. Others are proxies for outside interests. These are not the same problem and they cannot be solved with the same solution.

Second, insist on institutional anchors, not just ceasefires. The failure of Pretoria was not only that it ended the war. It is that it created no durable institutions capable of resolving the disputes it left open. The referendum on contested Welkite Tsegede territories — promised under the agreement — had still not taken place as of early 2025. There is no mechanism with genuine authority to enforce disarmament. There is no independent body to investigate the extrajudicial killings that Ethiopian federal forces and armed groups alike have committed. Ceasefires without institutional anchors are just scheduled delays.

Third, include civil society, not as decoration but as a counterweight. One of the core perversions of armed-actor-centered peace processes is that they exclude the people who actually live in the affected regions. In Amhara, in Oromia, in Tigray, there are communities, religious institutions, business networks, and civic organizations whose cooperation is necessary for any settlement to hold — and who currently have no seat at the table because they cannot field a militia. If Western embassies are serious about durable peace rather than managed calm, they need to be pressuring Addis Ababa to open space for these voices, not just for the armed ones.

“The question is not whether to negotiate. It is what negotiation is for.”

None of this is easy. All of it will take longer and require more sustained engagement than a ceasefire agreement. It will require the U.S. and the UK to do something their diplomatic institutions are not naturally structured to do: stay in a process beyond the point where violence has been reduced to a manageable level, and push for structural change that may temporarily increase political friction.

IV. Why this matters now

The TPLF’s decision in April 2026 to reinstate its regional government — effectively repudiating the Pretoria framework — is not a surprise. It is a consequence. When a peace agreement fails to resolve the disputes that caused the conflict, the parties eventually reach the same point again, except with additional grievances accumulated in the interim. The disarmament program was suspended. The territorial referendum did not happen. The federal government narrowed political space rather than opening it. The TPLF, facing internal fractures and external pressure, concluded that the agreement had served its purpose and stopped serving theirs.

Ethiopia is now facing the possibility of simultaneous crises in Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia — which is not a coincidence, but a structural feature of a peace process that resolved none of the underlying conflicts, only reduced their immediate intensity.

Western diplomacy can stop a war. The evidence for that is real. What it has consistently struggled with — in Bosnia, in South Sudan, in Libya, and now in Ethiopia — is building what comes after the ceasefire. That is a harder problem, requires a different kind of patience, and produces less visible short-term results. It also happens to be the only thing that actually works.

The current push from the U.S. and British embassies is rational on its own terms. The problem is that its terms are too narrow. Managed peace is better than unmanaged war. But it is not a substitute for the harder work of building a state in which armed actors have less reason to exist.

That is what Ethiopia needs. It is not what is on offer — at least not yet.

 Research sources: BTI 2026 Ethiopia Country Report • ACLED Situation Update Feb 2025 • CFR Global Conflict Tracker • Freedom House 2025 • Rift Valley Institute Conflict Trends March 2026 • Wilson Center / Dayton Analysis

The Fractured Spear: From Adwa’s Unity to Ethnic Federalism and the Path Back

The Fractured Spear: From Adwa’s Unity to Ethnic Federalism and the Path Back

By Emedo Farda    April 13,2026

 

Ethiopia’s modern history is a study in contradiction. At one pole stands the Battle of Adwa (1896), a shining moment when diverse ethnic groups—Amhara, Oromo, Tigrayan, Afar, Gurage, and Somali—fused into a single, invincible army to crush Italian colonialism. At the other lies the reign of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (1991–2012), who systematically reorganized political life along rigid ethnic lines, embedding division into the constitution itself. Between these two poles, contemporary Ethiopia under PM Abiy Ahmed struggles violently, trapped between the memory of unity and the machinery of fragmentation. This essay argues that while Adwa demonstrated the possibility of trans-ethnic solidarity, Meles’ ethnic federalism institutionalized division; rebuilding Ethiopian unity requires dismantling that institutional legacy while reviving a civic, rather than ethnic, national identity.

Adwa as the Blueprint of Unity

The Battle of Adwa was not merely a military victory—it was a political miracle. On March 1, 1896, Emperor Menelik II of Shewa and Empress Taytu Betul mobilized a pan-Ethiopian force that transcended parochial loyalties. Oromo cavalry charged alongside Amhara spearmen; Tigrayan peasants held the lines with Afar and Somali irregulars. This coalition was not born of abstract nationalism but of a shared, existential threat to Ethiopian sovereignty. The victory shattered the myth of European invincibility and created a powerful collective memory: diversity, when united against a common foe, is a source of strength, not weakness. Adwa became the foundational myth of Ethiopian unity—a civic, territorial unity that did not erase ethnic identities but subordinated them to a higher national purpose.

Meles Zenawi and the Institutionalization of Division

If Adwa represented synthesis, Meles Zenawi’s reign represented systematic antithesis. After seizing power in 1991, Meles inherited a highly centralized but often oppressive state. However, his response was not to build a civic, multi-ethnic democracy but to entrench ethnicity as the sole organizing principle of political life. The 1995 Constitution legally divided Ethiopia into ethnically defined regional states (kililoch)—Tigray, Oromia, Amhara Afar, Somali, Southerb Nationalities and others.

More critically, the political system banned national parties, forcing all political organization along ethnic lines. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was itself a coalition of four ethnic parties, not a national movement. This institutionalization transformed flexible, overlapping loyalties into rigid, legally enforced categories. Where Adwa celebrated inter-ethnic cooperation, Meles’ system incentivized intra-ethnic competition, suspicion, and zero-sum thinking. A citizen’s political rights, administrative representation, and access to land and resources became contingent on their ethnic designation. The long-term impact was corrosive: land disputes became ethnic conflicts; universities divided into ethnic dormitories; and the national army fractured into perceived ethnic militias. The unity forged at Adwa was replaced by a confederal logic that prioritized the rights of the ethnic group over the rights of the Ethiopian citizen.

The Synthesis Struggle: Ethiopia Under Abiy Ahmed

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (since 2018) inherited this fractured architecture. Rhetorically, he embraced the spirit of Adwa, launching the “Medemer” (Synergy) movement, dissolving the EPRDF into a single national Prosperity Party, and declaring that ethnic federalism had caused “political schizophrenia.” He won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for ending the two-decade stalemate with Eritrea. However, Abiy attempted to remove the superstructure (the EPRDF) without dismantling the legal foundation (the 1995 constitution). Because the old ethnic rules remained in law, his centralizing moves were perceived as a threat by ethnic groups—particularly the Tigrayans—who had been the architects of the Meles system. The result was not unity but the catastrophic Tigray War (2020–2022), a direct consequence of trying to impose Adwa-style central unity onto Meles-style ethnic states.

Today, Ethiopia remains trapped: ethnic militias (Fano in Amhara, OLF factions in Oromia) roam freely; the central government controls the capital but not the countryside; and the spontaneous cross-ethnic mobilization of Adwa seems almost impossible. Abiy wanted to be Menelik II, but he governs within the constitutional prison built by Meles Zenawi.

What Can Be Done to Enhance Ethiopian Unity?

Breaking out of this prison requires a multi-pronged strategy that addresses legal structures, political incentives, civic education, and economic interdependence. The following measures, grounded in the lessons of Adwa and the failures of Meles, offer a realistic path forward.

1. Constitutional Reform Toward Civic Federalism

The 1995 constitution must be amended to remove ethnicity as the sole basis for regional administration. A system of civic federalism should be introduced, where regions are defined by geography and economic function rather than ethnic identity. Crucially, articles that enshrine the “right to self-determination up to secession” (Article 39) should be repealed or rendered virtually inoperable, as this clause incentivizes perpetual ethnic fragmentation. Any reform must be negotiated through an inclusive, representative constitutional assembly—not imposed by the center.

2. Legalizing and Encouraging Multi-Ethnic Political Parties

Meles’ ban on national parties must be explicitly overturned. Ethiopia should adopt electoral laws that incentivize multi-ethnic, cross-regional parties—for example, requiring parties to field candidates in multiple regions or meet thresholds of ethnic diversity in their leadership. The Prosperity Party’s attempt at this is a start, but it remains widely seen as a continuation of the old system. A new generation of genuinely national parties must be allowed to compete.

3. A National Civic Education Campaign Centered on Adwa

The memory of Adwa should be revived not as ethnic propaganda but as a civic curriculum. Every Ethiopian student should learn not only the military history but the names of Oromo, Amhara, Tigrayan, Afar, Somali and Gurage leaders who fought together. National holidays, museums, and public media should celebrate figures from all ethnic backgrounds who contributed to Ethiopian sovereignty. This is not about erasing ethnic identity but about placing a shared civic identity alongside it.

4. Economic Interdependence as a Unifying Force

Ethnic conflict thrives when regions are economically self-sufficient or when resources are seen as zero-sum. The government should invest aggressively in trans-regional infrastructure—highways, railways, power grids, and digital networks—that tie the economies of Oromia, Amhara, Tigray, Afar, Somali, and the Southern regions together. When a farmer in Jimma depends on a market in Bahir Dar, and a manufacturer in Addis Ababa depends on electricity from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (which itself required national sacrifice), the cost of ethnic war becomes unbearably high.

5. Demilitarizing Ethnic Identity and Building a National Army

One of the most destructive legacies of Meles’ system was the erosion of a unified national military, replaced by regional special forces and ethnic militias. These must be disbanded and reintegrated into a single, professional, ethnically diverse national army whose loyalty is to the constitution, not to any region or group. This requires difficult but necessary security sector reform, including vetting, retraining, and a clear chain of command that bypasses regional party loyalties.

6. Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation

Ethiopia has endured decades of ethnic violence—under the Derg, under Meles, and in the post-2018 civil wars. A formal Truth and Reconciliation Commission (modeled on South Africa or Rwanda) should be established to document atrocities, assign responsibility without mass prosecution, and create a shared national narrative of suffering and survival. Without acknowledging past wounds, calls for unity will ring hollow.

From Ethnic Prison to a Civic Nation

The contrast between Adwa and Meles is not merely historical curiosity; it is the central tension of modern Ethiopian politics. Adwa proved that Ethiopia’s strength lies in its ability to transcend ethnic labels in the face of a common challenge. Meles proved that when ethnicity becomes the only legitimate basis for political organization, the state itself becomes a battlefield. PM Abiy’s Ethiopia is the tragic living synthesis of this contradiction—a leader who wants unity but governs under a constitution of division. The path forward is neither a return to a mythical, homogenized past nor a continuation of Meles’ ethnic prison. It is the hard, patient work of constitutional reform, civic education, economic interdependence, and demilitarization. Ethiopia will never forget its ethnic diversity—nor should it. But it can choose, as it did at Adwa, to subordinate that diversity to a higher, shared purpose: the survival and flourishing of one Ethiopia, united not by blood but by choice.

A Peaceful Path Forward in Tigray

To Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed: A Peaceful Path Forward in Tigray

Your Excellency Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed,

The intelligence before you reveals a truth your military briefings may obscure: the Tigrayan people are not your enemy, and the Tigray Defense Forces are not monolithic. The path to lasting peace lies not in encircling a region with two-thirds of your national army, but in understanding its internal fractures, addressing its people’s desperation, and outmaneuvering hardliners through political wisdom rather than military force.

Understanding the Current Reality

The Tigrayan population is exhausted, not eager for war. Civilians already flee toward Afar, not front lines. A displaced woman in Mekelle spoke for millions when she told Al Jazeera that recurring conflict has made them “zombies rather than citizens.” Young people contact smugglers for passage to Europe rather than endure another siege. This is not a population clamoring for battle—it is a population crying for survival.

Eighty percent of Tigray’s people require emergency support. Public services have collapsed for months. Hospitals remain destroyed from the previous war. Teachers go unpaid. Families remain separated, with thousands still not knowing the fate of loved ones kidnapped years ago. In this environment, food and medicine are more powerful weapons than drones or artillery.

The Tigray Defense Forces themselves are deeply divided. The hardliner faction under Debretsion Gebremichael now controls Mekelle, having ousted the moderate Getachew Reda, who fled to Addis Ababa. This split is your greatest diplomatic asset—if you understand how to use it. The hardliners seized territories along the Amhara border—Korem, Alamata, Tselemti—precisely because they need to demonstrate strength to justify their internal coup. They fear appearing weak before their own commanders and a skeptical population.

Your current military encirclement plays directly into their narrative. When Tigrayans see federal troops massing on all sides—along the Eritrean border, the Afar border, the Amhara border—they do not see a government seeking peace. They see preparation for annihilation. This consolidates hardliner control and drowns out moderate voices who might advocate for dialogue.

The so-called “Tsimdo” alliance with Eritrea emerged from desperation, not ideology. Debretsion’s faction partnered with Asmara only after losing faith in the Pretoria Agreement’s implementation. They see Amhara forces still occupying disputed territories. They see Eritrean troops remaining entrenched inside Tigray—in Aksum, where massacres occurred; in Shire, where homes were destroyed; across northern and western areas. They see IDP returns stalled and constitutional restoration delayed. Your government’s failure to deliver these peace terms handed Eritrea its opening.

Recommended Action Items for Peace

First, establish immediate, unimpeded humanitarian corridors. Direct your ministers to coordinate with the UN and international NGOs to surge food, medicine, and essential supplies into all parts of Tigray. Restore electricity, telecommunications, and banking services without precondition. A starving population cannot embrace peace. A population that receives life-saving assistance from your government begins to question hardliner narratives that you seek their destruction. This is not weakness—it is the most effective counter-insurgency strategy available.

Second, make public, verifiable progress on territorial withdrawals. Create a joint monitoring mechanism with international observers to oversee the phased withdrawal of Eritrean forces from Tigrayan territory. Publish timelines and verification reports. Simultaneously, engage Amhara regional authorities in a transparent process regarding disputed western territories. When Tigrayans see concrete action on the ground—not just promises—you rob hardliners of their primary mobilization narrative.Third, engage Tigray’s civil society directly, not just military commanders. The Tigray Independence Party and other local voices have publicly rejected attempts to mobilize the population for renewed war. They understand that another conflict brings only suffering and displacement. Convene a inclusive dialogue in a neutral location—perhaps Nairobi or Djibouti—that includes women’s groups, religious leaders, business associations, academics, and displaced persons. Let Tigrayans speak their grievances directly. Let them see you listening.

Fourth, address the internal TPLF split strategically. The moderate faction under Getachew Reda and Tsadkan Gebretensae is now physically located outside Tigray. They represent a genuine alternative to hardliner control. Support their ability to communicate with Tigrayans through uncensored media. Allow them to present a vision of peace and reconstruction that competes with the hardliners’ war narrative. A political solution requires a credible political alternative.

Fifth, de-escalate militarily as a confidence-building measure. Order a unilateral withdrawal of ENDF forces from forward positions along Tigray’s borders. Replace military encirclement with a verified demilitarized zone monitored by international observers. When you demobilize two-thirds of your army from the region, you remove the hardliners’ strongest argument: that Tigray faces imminent attack requiring unified military resistance.

Sixth, reopen the Pretoria Agreement implementation process with renewed international guarantors. Invite the African Union, United Nations, and United States to reconvene with all parties—including Eritrea—to establish clear benchmarks, timelines, and enforcement mechanisms for the outstanding provisions of the peace deal. Make implementation transparent and verifiable.

Your Excellency, the people of Tigray do not want martyrdom. They want to bury their dead, feed their children, and rebuild their lives. Give them that, and you isolate the hardliners completely. Give them only drones and military command posts, and you unite every Tigrayan against you—not out of love for the TPLF, but out of fear for their survival.

The wisdom to govern is not demonstrated through firepower but through the ability to see beyond immediate military advantage to lasting political resolution. Ethiopia’s unity cannot be bombed into existence. It must be built through justice, inclusion, and the genuine address of grievances.

The path forward is clear. The question is whether you will take it.