Notes

On Ethiopia's Foreign Investment Landscape

Ethiopia’s foreign investment landscape is dominated by a mix of countries, with **China** leading significantly, followed by key players from the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. Here’s a breakdown of the top investors and their sectors:

### Top Foreign Investors:

1. **China**:  

   – **Dominant Sector**: Infrastructure (roads, railways, industrial parks), manufacturing, and energy.  

   – **Examples**: Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway, Eastern Industrial Zone, hydropower projects.  

   – **Why**: Strategic BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) partnerships and government-backed loans.

2. **Saudi Arabia & UAE**:  

   – **Dominant Sector**: Agriculture (land leases for food security), logistics, ports, and hospitality.  

   – **Examples**: UAE’s AD Ports Group operating Somaliland’s Berbera Corridor linked to Ethiopia; Saudi Star Agricultural Development.  

   – **Why**: Geopolitical interests in Horn of Africa stability and resource access.

3. **Turkey**:  

   – **Dominant Sector**: Textiles, manufacturing, and hospitality.  

   – **Examples**: Major industrial zones in Hawassa and Dire Dawa; investments by companies like Ayka Textiles.  

4. **India**:  

   – **Dominant Sector**: Agriculture, manufacturing (pharmaceuticals, textiles), and services.  

   – **Examples**: Investments by companies like Karuturi Global (agribusiness, though scaled back) and Birla Group.  

5. **United States & Europe**:  

   – **Key Players**: Netherlands (floriculture, renewables), UK (consumer goods), Germany (engineering), and USA (aviation, tech).  

   – **Examples**: Heineken (Brewery), Diageo (beverages), Siemens, and Boeing.  

### Other Notable Investors:

– **Egypt & Sudan**: Focused on agriculture and cross-border trade.  

– **South Korea**: Manufacturing and textiles (e.g., shoe factories in Addis).  

– **Development Finance Institutions (DFIs)**: IFC (World Bank), CDC Group (UK), and Proparco (France) fund private-sector projects.

### Key Trends & Context:

– **Shift Post-2018**: Gulf investments surged after Ethiopia’s political reforms, targeting ports (e.g., UAE’s stake in Berbera) and agriculture.  

– **Manufacturing Focus**: Ethiopia’s industrial parks (Bole Lemi, Hawassa) attract textile/footwear giants (PVH, H&M suppliers).  

– **Challenges**: Currency shortages, bureaucratic hurdles, and recent conflict (2020–2022) slowed some investments.  

– **New Opportunities**: Telecom liberalization (Safaricom consortium) and renewable energy (geothermal, wind).  

### Data Sources (Vary by Year):

– **Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC)**: Lists China, India, Turkey as top sources by project numbers.  

– **Capital Flow**: Gulf states lead in high-value deals (e.g., UAE’s $1.6B telecom license in 2024).  

**In summary**, **China** remains Ethiopia’s largest investor in infrastructure and industry, while **Gulf nations (UAE/Saudi)** drive strategic agribusiness and port investments. Diversification is growing, with Turkey, India, and European firms expanding manufacturing footprints.

A review

Building a Durable Accommodation with Eritrea

Addissu Admas’ article (read here), “Building a Durable Accommodation with Eritrea,” presents a compelling and urgent argument for diplomatic negotiations between Ethiopia and Eritrea over access to the Red Sea. The strength of this piece lies in its historical depth, logical reasoning, and pragmatic approach to a contentious geopolitical issue that threatens regional stability
 
 The author meticulously traces the colonial origins of Eritrea’s coastline, highlighting how arbitrary borders imposed by Italy have left Ethiopia landlocked. This framing is crucial because it underscores that Ethiopia’s demand is not expansionist but rooted in historical continuity, economic necessity, and sovereign rights.
 
Admas firmly opposes war as a solution, recognizing that conflict would be catastrophic for both nations. Instead, he advocates for negotiation under international mediation (UN/AU), which demonstrates a rational and ethical stance. His comparison to the Danzig Corridor is particularly insightful, offering a historical precedent for peaceful territorial accommodations.
 
The article convincingly argues that Eritrea stands to gain economically from leasing Assab to Ethiopia, given Djibouti’s current dominance in handling Ethiopian trade. The proposal is not one-sided but suggests mutual benefits—something Eritrea’s leadership should consider if economic growth is a priority.
 
The author rightly points out the injustice of a nation of 120+ million people being held hostage by Eritrea’s refusal to negotiate. Ethiopia’s security concerns, particularly regarding naval defense, are legitimate in an era of increasing Red Sea militarization (e.g., UAE, Turkey, and Saudi bases in the region).
 
While the article is persuasive, it could address Eritrea’s perspective more thoroughly. President Isaias Afwerki’s regime thrives on isolationism and distrust of Ethiopia, shaped by decades of war. A durable solution must also consider Eritrea’s security paranoia—how can Ethiopia assure Asmara that leased territory won’t become a Trojan horse?
 
Additionally, the Somaliland MoU reference is risky—Eritrea may view this as Ethiopia’s “expansionist blueprint,” undermining trust. Instead, the focus should be on exclusive economic incentives, such as joint port management, infrastructure investments, or even shared naval facilities under AU oversight.
 
The final verdict …a  Necessary Call for Diplomacy
 
Admas’ article is a timely, well-reasoned appeal to avoid another catastrophic Horn of Africa war. His arguments are rooted in historical fairness, economic logic, and strategic necessity, making a strong case for why Eritrea must come to the table. However, success will require confidence-building measures, international guarantees, and creative compromises—not just historical analogies.
 
The alternative—continued stalemate—only fuels instability. As the Red Sea becomes a global flashpoint, Ethiopia cannot afford indefinite dependency on Djibouti, and Eritrea cannot afford perpetual hostility with its largest neighbor. Negotiation is not a choice; it is an inevitability. The only question is whether both nations will act before or after another avoidable war.

A review

The Flaws in the Argument on 
"Western" Tigray

The op-ed “Unfulfilled Promises, Unstable Peace” (see here) presents a one-sided narrative that overlooks critical historical, legal, and geopolitical realities surrounding Western Tigray. While it correctly identifies some failures in implementing the Pretoria Agreement, its core argument—that the federal government is deliberately enabling Amhara “annexation” while allowing the TPLF to exploit grievances—is flawed in three key ways: it ignores historical context, misrepresents constitutional and legal realities, and oversimplifies Ethiopia’s current security dilemmas.

The article frames Western Tigray (Welkait, Humera, Tsegede) as indisputably Tigrayan territory, ignoring decades of contested governance. Before the TPLF-dominated EPRDF redrew boundaries in the 1990s, these areas were administered under Begemder province, with a mixed Amhara-Tigrayan population. The claim that Amhara forces “illegally annexed” the region disregards longstanding Amhara grievances over what they see as a TPLF-imposed boundary. While the 1995 constitution placed the area under Tigray, this decision was never fully accepted by Amhara nationalists. The article’s dismissal of these historical disputes undermines its credibility.

The author insists that the federal government must enforce the constitution by restoring Tigray’s pre-war control, but this ignores Ethiopia’s post-war realities. The Pretoria Agreement did not explicitly mandate an immediate return to pre-2020 boundaries; instead, it called for a constitutional resolution of disputes. Given the mass displacement, alleged war crimes, and ongoing insurgencies (including the Fano rebellion in Amhara), a forced handover to Tigray would trigger further violence. The article’s demand for an unconditional Tigrayan return disregards the security vacuum and risks inflaming Amhara militancy.

The op-ed accuses the federal government of “deliberate inaction” to weaken Tigray, but this ignores broader instability. Since 2023, the government has been fighting the Fano insurgency, which opposes any concessions to Tigray. Simultaneously, Eritrea’s lingering presence complicates demilitarization. The author’s suggestion that Addis Ababa could easily expel Amhara forces or Eritrean troops underestimates Ethiopia’s current  security landscape.

The article’s argument hinges on a simplistic moral binary—pitting Tigrayan victimhood against federal and Amhara villainy—while ignoring the complex trade-offs required for lasting peace. Yes, the Pretoria Agreement should be fully implemented, but this requires negotiation, not unilateral enforcement. A sustainable solution must address Amhara grievances, guarantee security for returning IDPs, and prevent further conflict—not just echo TPLF-era territorial maximalism.

The path forward is not through polemics (ለተቀማጭሰማይ ቅርቡ ነው)  but inclusive dialogue, constitutional reforms, and phased returns that balance all stakeholders concerns. The author’s failure to acknowledge this reality weakens his case.

A review

The Weaknesses of an Unbalanced Critique of Abiy Ahmed’s Leadership

Comment on this article by  Emedo Farda July 11, 2025 At 11:59 am

The argument that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed relies solely on war and instability to maintain power suffers from several weaknesses, undermining its credibility as a balanced assessment. First, it presents an overly deterministic view of Abiy’s motives, reducing complex political decisions to mere distractions from domestic crises. While conflict has been a recurring feature of his leadership, other factors—such as regional security dynamics, internal factionalism, or a genuine belief in Ethiopian unity—may also shape his policies. Additionally, Ethiopia’s landlocked status and economic reliance on port access provide legitimate strategic motivations for his Red Sea rhetoric, rather than merely being a diversionary tactic.
Tthe comparison to Saddam Hussein is hyperbolic and lacks nuance. Unlike Saddam’s outright invasion of Kuwait, Abiy’s statements on sea access have been framed as negotiable, not as a declaration of war. Historical analogies can be useful, but without clear evidence of expansionist intent, such parallels risk being misleading.
The assumption that war with Eritrea is inevitable is speculative. Despite tensions, Ethiopia and Eritrea have a complex relationship, alternating between conflict and cooperation. Claims that Abiy is actively seeking a pretext for invasion require more concrete evidence than rhetorical posturing.
Moreover, the critique omits counterarguments, such as Abiy’s early reforms, mediation efforts in Sudan, or negotiations with international financial institutions. A fair analysis should acknowledge these complexities rather than attributing every crisis to deliberate malfeasance.
Finally, while advocating for nonviolent resistance is commendable, the argument oversimplifies Ethiopia’s political landscape. State repression, ethnic fragmentation, and limited civic space make mass mobilization extremely difficult, a challenge understated in the critique.
While the argument raises valid concerns, its one-sided, conspiratorial framing weakens its persuasiveness. A balanced assessment must consider structural challenges, alternative explanations, and the broader context of Ethiopian politics—rather than reducing everything to Abiy’s supposed manipulation

The Rise and Fall of the TPLF:FROM DOMINANCE to REGIONAL irrelevance in Ethiopia

The Rise and Fall of the TPLF: From Dominance to Regional Irrelevance in Ethiopia


The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was once the most powerful political and military force in Ethiopia, shaping the country’s destiny for nearly three decades. Emerging from a guerrilla movement that helped overthrow the brutal Derg regime in 1991, the TPLF became the core of Ethiopia’s ruling coalition, implementing a system of ethnic federalism that centralized power under its control. However, its dominance unraveled dramatically after 2018, culminating in a devastating civil war (2020–2022) that left the group militarily defeated and politically isolated. Today, the TPLF is a shadow of its former self—confined to Tigray, stripped of national influence, and struggling to redefine its role in an Ethiopia increasingly dominated by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party.

This essay examines the TPLF’s descent from power, analyzing the key factors behind its decline and assessing whether it can ever regain a meaningful role in Ethiopia’s federal government. By tracing its trajectory—from revolutionary force to ruling party, then to rebellion and marginalization—we can better understand its current predicament and future prospects.

The TPLF was founded in 1975 as a Marxist-Leninist insurgent group fighting against Ethiopia’s military dictatorship, the Derg. Alongside the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), it played a decisive role in toppling Mengistu Hailemariam’s regime in 1991. Following the Derg’s collapse, the TPLF established the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of ethnically based parties that governed Ethiopia for 27 years.

The TPLF-designed 1995 Constitution introduced ethnic federalism, dividing Ethiopia into ethnically defined regions with theoretical autonomy. In practice, however, power remained centralized under the EPRDF, with the TPLF as its dominant faction. Despite Tigrayans constituting only about 6% of Ethiopia’s population, the TPLF controlled the military and intelligence apparatus (through the ENDF and National Intelligence and Security Service, NISS), key economic sectors (via party-affiliated conglomerates like ENDF’s METEC and Tigrayan-owned businesses), regional administrations (by placing loyalists in key positions across Ethiopia). This system ensured Tigrayan dominance while maintaining a façade of multi-ethnic governance.

While Ethiopia experienced rapid economic growth under the EPRDF, political repression intensified. The TPLF rigged elections (notably in 2005 and 2015) jailed opposition leaders and journalists,suppressed protests (e.g., the 2014–2018 Oromo and Amhara uprisings).By the mid-2010s, public anger against Tigrayan overrepresentation in government and security forces reached a boiling point, setting the stage for the TPLF’s downfall.

In 2018, following years of anti-government protests, the EPRDF appointed Abiy Ahmed as prime minister. Abiy quickly moved to sideline the TPLF, purging Tigrayan officials from key institutions and dismantling EPRDF structures. In 2019, he dissolved the EPRDF and formed the Prosperity Party (PP) which the TPLF opted out from joining. The TPLF retreated to Tigray, refusing to recognize Abiy’s reforms and accusing him of centralizing power. Tensions escalated when the TPLF held unauthorized regional elections in September 2020, defying a federal postponement due to COVID-19. In November 2020, the conflict turned violent when TPLF forces attacked federal military bases in Tigray. PM Abiy responded with a full-scale military offensive, backed by Eritrean troops and Amhara regional forces.

Phases of the war were Federal-Eritrean Offensive (Nov 2020–June 2021) when the TPLF lost major cities like Mekelle but regrouped as a guerrilla force. The TPLF counteroffensive (June–Dec 2021) advanced into Amhara and Afar regions, threatening Addis Ababa but the Federal counterattack in (Dec 2021–Nov 2022 with drone support, pushed the TPLF back into Tigray. US and its allies stated the war was marked by mass atrocities, including ethnic cleansing, mass killings, and famine, with all sides accused of war crimes.

Under international pressure, the TPLF signed a peace deal in Pretoria, agreeing to disarm and demobilize its fighters, recognize federal authority and end all hostilities. This agreement effectively ended the TPLF’s military resistance, reducing it to a regional political entity with no leverage over national politics.

Today, the TPLF no longer holds federal positions and has no representation in Abiy’s Prosperity Party and exists only as Tigray’s ruling party, but under federal oversight. The TPLF has no chance of returning to to Federal Power and several factors make a TPLF resurgence unlikely . First, the loss of Military Power by the Pretoria Agreement which forced the TPLF to disarm, removing its ability to challenge the federal government militarily and second PM Abiy’s consolidation of Power through the Prosperity Party which dominates Ethiopian politics and has systematically weakened ethnic-based parties. Also, widespread resentment against the TPLF persists and Amhara and Oromo factions (historically oppressed by the TPLF) now hold key federal positions.

Many Ethiopians blame the TPLF for past repression, corruption, and the Tigray War’s devastation. Tigray remains devastated by war, with reconstruction slow and federal aid limited. Future Scenarios may include TPLF retaining control over Tigray but as a subordinate actor to the federal government. Younger Tigrayan leaders may push for reform, leading to splits between hardliners and moderates.

From revolutionary force to ruling party to regional pariah—reflects the turbulent nature of Ethiopian politics. The TPLF’s authoritarian legacy, military defeat, and loss of national credibility have rendered it a spent force in federal governance. While it may cling to power in Tigray, its prospects of returning to national dominance are virtually nonexistent.

Ethiopia’s political future now lies in the hands of the Prosperity Party, which seeks to centralize power while managing ethnic tensions. The TPLF’s fate serves as a cautionary tale i.e. no ruling party, no matter how entrenched, is immune to collapse when it loses popular legitimacy. For now, the TPLF remains a relic of Ethiopia’s past—not its future.

TPLF’s rise and fall, demonstrates how its overreach, repression, and ultimate military defeat led to its current irrelevance. The TPLF’s era of dominance is over. Its future now depends on whether it can reinvent itself as a peaceful regional party or fade into obscurity as Ethiopia moves forward under new leadership.