The Rise and Fall of the TPLF:FROM DOMINANCE to REGIONAL irrelevance in Ethiopia

The Rise and Fall of the TPLF: From Dominance to Regional Irrelevance in Ethiopia


The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was once the most powerful political and military force in Ethiopia, shaping the country’s destiny for nearly three decades. Emerging from a guerrilla movement that helped overthrow the brutal Derg regime in 1991, the TPLF became the core of Ethiopia’s ruling coalition, implementing a system of ethnic federalism that centralized power under its control. However, its dominance unraveled dramatically after 2018, culminating in a devastating civil war (2020–2022) that left the group militarily defeated and politically isolated. Today, the TPLF is a shadow of its former self—confined to Tigray, stripped of national influence, and struggling to redefine its role in an Ethiopia increasingly dominated by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party.

This essay examines the TPLF’s descent from power, analyzing the key factors behind its decline and assessing whether it can ever regain a meaningful role in Ethiopia’s federal government. By tracing its trajectory—from revolutionary force to ruling party, then to rebellion and marginalization—we can better understand its current predicament and future prospects.

The TPLF was founded in 1975 as a Marxist-Leninist insurgent group fighting against Ethiopia’s military dictatorship, the Derg. Alongside the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), it played a decisive role in toppling Mengistu Hailemariam’s regime in 1991. Following the Derg’s collapse, the TPLF established the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of ethnically based parties that governed Ethiopia for 27 years.

The TPLF-designed 1995 Constitution introduced ethnic federalism, dividing Ethiopia into ethnically defined regions with theoretical autonomy. In practice, however, power remained centralized under the EPRDF, with the TPLF as its dominant faction. Despite Tigrayans constituting only about 6% of Ethiopia’s population, the TPLF controlled the military and intelligence apparatus (through the ENDF and National Intelligence and Security Service, NISS), key economic sectors (via party-affiliated conglomerates like ENDF’s METEC and Tigrayan-owned businesses), regional administrations (by placing loyalists in key positions across Ethiopia). This system ensured Tigrayan dominance while maintaining a façade of multi-ethnic governance.

While Ethiopia experienced rapid economic growth under the EPRDF, political repression intensified. The TPLF rigged elections (notably in 2005 and 2015) jailed opposition leaders and journalists,suppressed protests (e.g., the 2014–2018 Oromo and Amhara uprisings).By the mid-2010s, public anger against Tigrayan overrepresentation in government and security forces reached a boiling point, setting the stage for the TPLF’s downfall.

In 2018, following years of anti-government protests, the EPRDF appointed Abiy Ahmed as prime minister. Abiy quickly moved to sideline the TPLF, purging Tigrayan officials from key institutions and dismantling EPRDF structures. In 2019, he dissolved the EPRDF and formed the Prosperity Party (PP) which the TPLF opted out from joining. The TPLF retreated to Tigray, refusing to recognize Abiy’s reforms and accusing him of centralizing power. Tensions escalated when the TPLF held unauthorized regional elections in September 2020, defying a federal postponement due to COVID-19. In November 2020, the conflict turned violent when TPLF forces attacked federal military bases in Tigray. PM Abiy responded with a full-scale military offensive, backed by Eritrean troops and Amhara regional forces.

Phases of the war were Federal-Eritrean Offensive (Nov 2020–June 2021) when the TPLF lost major cities like Mekelle but regrouped as a guerrilla force. The TPLF counteroffensive (June–Dec 2021) advanced into Amhara and Afar regions, threatening Addis Ababa but the Federal counterattack in (Dec 2021–Nov 2022 with drone support, pushed the TPLF back into Tigray. US and its allies stated the war was marked by mass atrocities, including ethnic cleansing, mass killings, and famine, with all sides accused of war crimes.

Under international pressure, the TPLF signed a peace deal in Pretoria, agreeing to disarm and demobilize its fighters, recognize federal authority and end all hostilities. This agreement effectively ended the TPLF’s military resistance, reducing it to a regional political entity with no leverage over national politics.

Today, the TPLF no longer holds federal positions and has no representation in Abiy’s Prosperity Party and exists only as Tigray’s ruling party, but under federal oversight. The TPLF has no chance of returning to to Federal Power and several factors make a TPLF resurgence unlikely . First, the loss of Military Power by the Pretoria Agreement which forced the TPLF to disarm, removing its ability to challenge the federal government militarily and second PM Abiy’s consolidation of Power through the Prosperity Party which dominates Ethiopian politics and has systematically weakened ethnic-based parties. Also, widespread resentment against the TPLF persists and Amhara and Oromo factions (historically oppressed by the TPLF) now hold key federal positions.

Many Ethiopians blame the TPLF for past repression, corruption, and the Tigray War’s devastation. Tigray remains devastated by war, with reconstruction slow and federal aid limited. Future Scenarios may include TPLF retaining control over Tigray but as a subordinate actor to the federal government. Younger Tigrayan leaders may push for reform, leading to splits between hardliners and moderates.

From revolutionary force to ruling party to regional pariah—reflects the turbulent nature of Ethiopian politics. The TPLF’s authoritarian legacy, military defeat, and loss of national credibility have rendered it a spent force in federal governance. While it may cling to power in Tigray, its prospects of returning to national dominance are virtually nonexistent.

Ethiopia’s political future now lies in the hands of the Prosperity Party, which seeks to centralize power while managing ethnic tensions. The TPLF’s fate serves as a cautionary tale i.e. no ruling party, no matter how entrenched, is immune to collapse when it loses popular legitimacy. For now, the TPLF remains a relic of Ethiopia’s past—not its future.

TPLF’s rise and fall, demonstrates how its overreach, repression, and ultimate military defeat led to its current irrelevance. The TPLF’s era of dominance is over. Its future now depends on whether it can reinvent itself as a peaceful regional party or fade into obscurity as Ethiopia moves forward under new leadership.

Reviving Peace with Eritrea: A Path to Lasting Legacy for PM Abiy Ahmed

Reviving Peace with Eritrea: A Path to Lasting Legacy for PM Abiy Ahmed 


Introduction

Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed made history in 2019 by ending a decades-long stalemate with Eritrea, a feat that earned him the Nobel Peace Prize. However, the initial optimism surrounding the peace deal has waned, with tensions resurfacing and the broader Horn of Africa region remaining volatile. To cement his legacy as a transformative leader and peacemaker, PM Abiy must prioritize reviving and deepening peaceful relations with Eritrea. This essay argues that renewed diplomacy with Eritrea is not only essential for regional stability but also a moral imperative for Ethiopia’s long-term prosperity. By addressing the root causes of conflict, fostering economic integration, and promoting people-to-people ties, PM Abiy can reclaim his role as a global symbol of peace and reconciliation.

Historical Context: The Stakes of Ethiopia-Eritrea Relations

The relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea has been fraught with conflict since Eritrea gained independence in 1993. The 1998-2000 border war, which claimed tens of thousands of lives, left deep scars and entrenched mistrust between the two nations. Despite the 2018 peace agreement, which formally ended the state of war, progress has stalled. Key issues, such as border demarcation, trade, and political cooperation, remain unresolved. For PM Abiy, reviving this relationship is not just a diplomatic challenge but a historical responsibility. Ethiopia and Eritrea share cultural, linguistic, and economic ties that predate colonial borders. A lasting peace would not only benefit both nations but also set a precedent for conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa, a region plagued by instability. By addressing these historical grievances, PM Abiy can demonstrate that peace is not merely the absence of war but the presence of justice and mutual respect.

The Moral Imperative: Peace as a Foundation for Prosperity

Peace with Eritrea is not just a political objective but a moral imperative. The ongoing tensions have dire humanitarian consequences, including displacement, economic hardship, and the militarization of borders. For ordinary Ethiopians and Eritreans, peace means access to trade, reunification of families, and the opportunity to build a better future. PM Abiy’s initial peace efforts were celebrated because they offered hope to millions who had suffered the consequences of conflict. However, the failure to sustain this momentum has led to disillusionment. By reviving peaceful relations, PM Abiy can reaffirm his commitment to the well-being of both nations. Moreover, peace with Eritrea would free up resources for development, allowing Ethiopia to focus on internal challenges such as poverty, unemployment, and political reform. A stable relationship with Eritrea would also enhance Ethiopia’s credibility as a regional leader, reinforcing its role in mediating conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia.

Economic Integration: Unlocking the Potential of Peace

One of the most compelling arguments for reviving peace with Eritrea is the economic potential it unlocks. Before the border war, Eritrea’s ports of Massawa and Assab were vital gateways for Ethiopian trade. The closure of these routes forced Ethiopia to rely on Djibouti, increasing costs and limiting economic opportunities. A renewed peace agreement could reopen these ports, boosting trade and reducing transportation costs for Ethiopian businesses. Furthermore, economic integration between the two nations could spur investment in infrastructure, energy, and agriculture, creating jobs and improving living standards. For Eritrea, which faces severe economic challenges, access to Ethiopia’s large market could provide a much-needed lifeline. PM Abiy has the opportunity to champion a vision of shared prosperity, where peace is not just a political achievement but an economic necessity. By prioritizing economic cooperation, he can demonstrate that peace is not a zero-sum game but a win-win for both nations.

Regional Stability: A Ripple Effect of Peace

The Horn of Africa is one of the most volatile regions in the world, with conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia threatening regional stability. A stable relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea could serve as a cornerstone for broader peace efforts. Historically, Ethiopia and Eritrea have been key players in regional politics, often supporting opposing factions in neighboring conflicts. By aligning their interests and working together, they could play a pivotal role in mediating disputes and promoting stability. For PM Abiy, this would not only enhance Ethiopia’s regional influence but also position him as a global peacemaker. The international community, including the African Union and the United Nations, would likely support such efforts, providing diplomatic and financial backing. A renewed commitment to peace with Eritrea could thus have a ripple effect, transforming the Horn of Africa from a region of conflict to one of cooperation.

The Nobel Prize and Beyond: Cementing a Legacy

PM Abiy’s Nobel Peace Prize was a recognition of his bold efforts to end the stalemate with Eritrea. However, the true measure of his legacy will be whether this peace endures and deepens. By reviving peaceful relations, PM Abiy can reclaim his status as a global symbol of reconciliation. This would not only enhance his international standing but also inspire other leaders to pursue peace in their own contexts. Moreover, a lasting peace with Eritrea would address criticisms that the initial agreement was more symbolic than substantive. By tackling unresolved issues such as border demarcation and political cooperation, PM Abiy can demonstrate that his commitment to peace is unwavering. In doing so, he would not only secure his place in history but also set a powerful example for future generations.

Conclusion

Reviving peaceful relations with Eritrea is not just a diplomatic priority for PM Abiy Ahmed; it is a moral, economic, and strategic imperative. By addressing historical grievances, fostering economic integration, and promoting regional stability, PM Abiy can cement his legacy as a transformative leader and peacemaker. The Nobel Peace Prize was a recognition of his initial efforts, but the true test lies in sustaining and deepening this peace. For the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea, peace means hope, opportunity, and a chance to build a better future. For the Horn of Africa, it means a step toward lasting stability. And for PM Abiy, it means reclaiming his role as a global symbol of reconciliation. The path to peace is never easy, but it is always worth pursuing. By prioritizing this goal, PM Abiy can ensure that his legacy is not just a moment in history but a foundation for the future.

Ethiopia’s Quest for Sea Access: Challenges and Pathways

Ethiopia’s Quest for Sea Access: Challenges and Pathways

 Ethiopia, a landlocked country in the Horn of Africa, faces significant challenges in securing reliable access to the sea. This issue is not merely a logistical concern but a matter of national economic security and regional stability. With over 120 million people, Ethiopia is the second-most populous country in Africa and one of the fastest-growing economies on the continent. However, its lack of direct sea access has created economic vulnerabilities and logistical bottlenecks. This essay explores the current challenges Ethiopia faces in securing sea access, the potential pathways to overcome these challenges, and recommendations for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to achieve this critical goal.

Current Challenges in Securing Sea Access

Ethiopia’s dependence on Djibouti’s port for nearly 95% of its trade has created significant economic and logistical challenges. The high costs associated with using Djibouti’s facilities, coupled with congestion and inefficiencies, have strained Ethiopia’s economy. For instance, port fees, transportation costs, and delays in cargo handling have increased the prices of imported goods and reduced the competitiveness of Ethiopian exports. Moreover, Ethiopia’s reliance on a single port makes it vulnerable to disruptions. Any political instability, natural disaster, or conflict in Djibouti could severely impact Ethiopia’s trade and economy. This over-reliance underscores the urgent need for Ethiopia to diversify its sea access options.

Regional Tensions and Sovereignty Concerns

Ethiopia’s efforts to secure sea access have raised concerns among neighboring countries. Eritrea, Somalia, and Somaliland are wary of ceding control over their ports or territories, fearing a loss of sovereignty or economic leverage. For example, Ethiopia’s 2024 memorandum of understanding with Somaliland to lease a naval base and gain port access in Berbera was met with strong opposition from Somalia, which views Somaliland as part of its territory. These tensions highlight the delicate balance Ethiopia must strike between pursuing its economic interests and respecting the sovereignty of its neighbors. Any misstep could exacerbate regional conflicts and undermine Ethiopia’s diplomatic standing.

Political Instability in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa is one of the most politically unstable regions in the world, further complicating Ethiopia’s quest for sea access. Conflicts in Somalia, tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and internal disputes within Ethiopia itself—such as the Tigray crisis—create an environment of uncertainty. Regional instability deters foreign investment in infrastructure projects that could facilitate Ethiopia’s access to the sea. For instance, potential investors may hesitate to fund port developments or transportation networks in a region prone to conflict. Addressing these internal and regional challenges is essential for Ethiopia to create a stable environment conducive to securing sea access.

Geopolitical Competition

The Horn of Africa has become a focal point of geopolitical competition, with countries like the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and China investing heavily in regional ports. These global powers often have conflicting interests, making it difficult for Ethiopia to navigate the complex web of alliances and rivalries. For example, China’s investments in Djibouti’s ports and Turkey’s involvement in Somalia’s infrastructure projects create competing influences that Ethiopia must carefully manage. Balancing these geopolitical dynamics while pursuing its own interests is a significant challenge for Ethiopia’s leadership.

Potential Pathways for Sea Access

Despite these challenges, Ethiopia has several potential pathways to secure sea access. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has pursued a combination of diplomatic negotiations, infrastructure investments, and regional partnerships to achieve this goal. Below are some key strategies Ethiopia could explore:

Strengthening Relations with Eritrea

Eritrea’s ports of Assab and Massawa are the most logical options for Ethiopia, given their proximity and historical ties. The 2018 peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea marked a significant step toward normalizing relations, but deeper economic integration is needed to facilitate port access. Ethiopia could offer investments in Eritrea’s infrastructure or share revenue from port usage to incentivize cooperation. Confidence-building measures, such as cultural exchanges and trade partnerships, could also help mend historical tensions and build trust between the two nations.

Expanding Partnerships with Somaliland

Somaliland, though not internationally recognized, has functioning ports in Berbera and Bossaso. Ethiopia’s 2024 agreement with Somaliland to lease a naval base and gain port access in Berbera is a step in the right direction. However, this move has sparked tensions with Somalia, which views Somaliland as part of its territory. To avoid regional backlash, Ethiopia must address Somalia’s concerns and work with the African Union and the international community to mediate between the two parties. A tripartite agreement that respects Somalia’s sovereignty while granting Ethiopia access to Berbera could be a win-win solution.

Investing in Regional Infrastructure

Ethiopia could invest in infrastructure projects that connect its landlocked economy to ports in neighboring countries. For example, the development of railways and highways linking Ethiopia to ports in Kenya (Mombasa) or Sudan (Port Sudan) could provide alternative trade routes. These projects could be funded through partnerships with international organizations or foreign investors. Diversifying trade routes would reduce Ethiopia’s dependency on any single port and enhance its economic resilience.

Leveraging International Support

Ethiopia could seek support from global powers like the United States, the European Union, and China, which have strategic interests in the Horn of Africa. By positioning itself as a stabilizing force in the region, Ethiopia could attract funding and diplomatic backing for its sea access initiatives. International support could also help mediate regional disputes and facilitate infrastructure development.

Recommendations for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed

To achieve Ethiopia’s goal of securing sea access, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed must adopt a multifaceted approach that balances diplomacy, economic incentives, and regional stability. Below are specific recommendations:

1. Prioritize Diplomatic Engagement with Eritrea : Eritrea remains the most viable option for sea access due to its proximity and existing infrastructure. Abiy should prioritize building trust with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, offering economic incentives such as joint infrastructure projects or revenue-sharing agreements.

2. Mediate Between Somaliland and Somalia: Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland has potential but risks alienating Somalia. Abiy should work with the African Union and the international community to mediate between Somaliland and Somalia, ensuring that Ethiopia’s port access does not exacerbate regional conflicts.

3. Diversify Trade Routes: Ethiopia should not rely solely on one port or country for its sea access. Investing in infrastructure projects that connect Ethiopia to multiple ports, such as Mombasa (Kenya) and Port Sudan (Sudan), would reduce dependency on any single route and enhance economic resilience.

4.  Leverage International Partnerships: Abiy should seek support from global powers and international organizations to fund infrastructure projects and mediate regional disputes. By positioning Ethiopia as a key player in regional stability, Abiy could attract investment and diplomatic backing for his sea access initiatives.

5.  Promote Regional Integration: Ethiopia should champion regional integration initiatives, such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), to foster economic cooperation and reduce tensions. By promoting shared economic interests, Ethiopia could build stronger relationships with its neighbors. 

6. Address Internal Challenges: Ethiopia’s internal conflicts, such as the Tigray crisis, and armed groups in different regions of the country undermine its ability to negotiate from a position of strength. Abiy must prioritize national reconciliation and economic development to stabilize the country and enhance its regional influence.

Conclusion

Ethiopia’s quest for sea access is a complex but achievable goal that requires careful diplomacy, economic incentives, and regional cooperation. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed must navigate the challenges of over-reliance on Djibouti, regional tensions, and geopolitical competition while pursuing multiple pathways to secure port access. By prioritizing diplomatic engagement with Eritrea, mediating between Somaliland and Somalia, diversifying trade routes, and leveraging international support, Abiy can position Ethiopia as a regional leader and secure the sea access it needs for economic growth and national security. The success of this endeavor will not only benefit Ethiopia but also contribute to the stability and prosperity of the Horn of Africa.

In Solidarity with Ethiopians and Friends of Ethiopia

In these challenging times, as we witness the Amhara people’s steadfast resistance against repression under the Ethiopian government, it is imperative that we, as fellow Ethiopians, stand in solidarity and support their just cause.

While the government’s policy of disarming the Liyu Hail(s) and militias seems appropriate, it must be executed with compassion and non-violence by the respective regional administration. While the completion of disarmament of the TPLF on one hand and the fate of Wolkayit Tsegede on the other is still hanging, concerns of security of the Amhara people is understandable and sensitivity by PM Abiy’s government is essential when addressing the disarmament issue of their Killil.

The Ethiopian government’s portrayal of the Amhara resistance as a narrow-minded endeavor driven by chauvinism and reactionary sentiments is an attempt to undermine the genuine objections about disarming behind current Fano movement. We, as fellow Ethiopians, recognize that the Amhara people’s resistance is grounded in the resolute principle in ensuring that their struggle remains intertwined with the broader Ethiopian pursuit for justice and equality.

 

Let us not be swayed by social anarchists that only represent a small fraction of the Amhara population. Amhara peoples resistance is just and comes after years of maltreatment and inequity. The Ethiopian government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Abiy, has subjected the Amhara people to unbearable hardships, thus warranting their courageous stand against this injustice.

We acknowledge the valid concerns raised by our Amhara brothers and sisters regarding the actions of certain Oromo extremist groups. Hager Wodad condemns acts of violence, rape, killing, and destruction causing a great number of our brethren to internal displacements. We urge the Ethiopian government to intensify its efforts to protect citizens from the scourge of armed extremists and to root out any elements within the government that offer support to such radical agendas. Sustained assistance should be given to the internally displaced Amharas.

We concur with the statement that Amhara resistance is a reaction to a history of suffering, humiliation, and mistreatment. We wholeheartedly endorse their aspiration to reclaim their dignity and reject the continued maltreatment they endure. It is time for all Ethiopians who value reason and freedom to unite in solidarity with the Amhara people’s struggle against injustice within and out of their Killil and against the repressive acts of the current government.

Hager Wodad calls on all Ethiopians to stand together in support of a peaceful resolution to disarmament in the region . This isn’t just about the Amhara people – it’s about the collective welfare of our entire nation. By supporting the Amhara resistance, we are advancing a vision of Ethiopia that is just, inclusive, and respectful of the rights and aspirations of all its diverse citizens. Let us come together to build a better future for every Ethiopian.

First posted on Hager Wodad, Los Angeles, August 22,2023

Reprinted June 26, 2924.