The Rise and Fall of the TPLF: From Dominance to Regional Irrelevance in Ethiopia
The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was once the most powerful political and military force in Ethiopia, shaping the country’s destiny for nearly three decades. Emerging from a guerrilla movement that helped overthrow the brutal Derg regime in 1991, the TPLF became the core of Ethiopia’s ruling coalition, implementing a system of ethnic federalism that centralized power under its control. However, its dominance unraveled dramatically after 2018, culminating in a devastating civil war (2020–2022) that left the group militarily defeated and politically isolated. Today, the TPLF is a shadow of its former self—confined to Tigray, stripped of national influence, and struggling to redefine its role in an Ethiopia increasingly dominated by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party.
This essay examines the TPLF’s descent from power, analyzing the key factors behind its decline and assessing whether it can ever regain a meaningful role in Ethiopia’s federal government. By tracing its trajectory—from revolutionary force to ruling party, then to rebellion and marginalization—we can better understand its current predicament and future prospects.
The TPLF was founded in 1975 as a Marxist-Leninist insurgent group fighting against Ethiopia’s military dictatorship, the Derg. Alongside the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), it played a decisive role in toppling Mengistu Hailemariam’s regime in 1991. Following the Derg’s collapse, the TPLF established the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of ethnically based parties that governed Ethiopia for 27 years.
The TPLF-designed 1995 Constitution introduced ethnic federalism, dividing Ethiopia into ethnically defined regions with theoretical autonomy. In practice, however, power remained centralized under the EPRDF, with the TPLF as its dominant faction. Despite Tigrayans constituting only about 6% of Ethiopia’s population, the TPLF controlled the military and intelligence apparatus (through the ENDF and National Intelligence and Security Service, NISS), key economic sectors (via party-affiliated conglomerates like ENDF’s METEC and Tigrayan-owned businesses), regional administrations (by placing loyalists in key positions across Ethiopia). This system ensured Tigrayan dominance while maintaining a façade of multi-ethnic governance.
While Ethiopia experienced rapid economic growth under the EPRDF, political repression intensified. The TPLF rigged elections (notably in 2005 and 2015) jailed opposition leaders and journalists,suppressed protests (e.g., the 2014–2018 Oromo and Amhara uprisings).By the mid-2010s, public anger against Tigrayan overrepresentation in government and security forces reached a boiling point, setting the stage for the TPLF’s downfall.
In 2018, following years of anti-government protests, the EPRDF appointed Abiy Ahmed as prime minister. Abiy quickly moved to sideline the TPLF, purging Tigrayan officials from key institutions and dismantling EPRDF structures. In 2019, he dissolved the EPRDF and formed the Prosperity Party (PP) which the TPLF opted out from joining. The TPLF retreated to Tigray, refusing to recognize Abiy’s reforms and accusing him of centralizing power. Tensions escalated when the TPLF held unauthorized regional elections in September 2020, defying a federal postponement due to COVID-19. In November 2020, the conflict turned violent when TPLF forces attacked federal military bases in Tigray. PM Abiy responded with a full-scale military offensive, backed by Eritrean troops and Amhara regional forces.
Phases of the war were Federal-Eritrean Offensive (Nov 2020–June 2021) when the TPLF lost major cities like Mekelle but regrouped as a guerrilla force. The TPLF counteroffensive (June–Dec 2021) advanced into Amhara and Afar regions, threatening Addis Ababa but the Federal counterattack in (Dec 2021–Nov 2022 with drone support, pushed the TPLF back into Tigray. US and its allies stated the war was marked by mass atrocities, including ethnic cleansing, mass killings, and famine, with all sides accused of war crimes.
Under international pressure, the TPLF signed a peace deal in Pretoria, agreeing to disarm and demobilize its fighters, recognize federal authority and end all hostilities. This agreement effectively ended the TPLF’s military resistance, reducing it to a regional political entity with no leverage over national politics.
Today, the TPLF no longer holds federal positions and has no representation in Abiy’s Prosperity Party and exists only as Tigray’s ruling party, but under federal oversight. The TPLF has no chance of returning to to Federal Power and several factors make a TPLF resurgence unlikely . First, the loss of Military Power by the Pretoria Agreement which forced the TPLF to disarm, removing its ability to challenge the federal government militarily and second PM Abiy’s consolidation of Power through the Prosperity Party which dominates Ethiopian politics and has systematically weakened ethnic-based parties. Also, widespread resentment against the TPLF persists and Amhara and Oromo factions (historically oppressed by the TPLF) now hold key federal positions.
Many Ethiopians blame the TPLF for past repression, corruption, and the Tigray War’s devastation. Tigray remains devastated by war, with reconstruction slow and federal aid limited. Future Scenarios may include TPLF retaining control over Tigray but as a subordinate actor to the federal government. Younger Tigrayan leaders may push for reform, leading to splits between hardliners and moderates.
From revolutionary force to ruling party to regional pariah—reflects the turbulent nature of Ethiopian politics. The TPLF’s authoritarian legacy, military defeat, and loss of national credibility have rendered it a spent force in federal governance. While it may cling to power in Tigray, its prospects of returning to national dominance are virtually nonexistent.
Ethiopia’s political future now lies in the hands of the Prosperity Party, which seeks to centralize power while managing ethnic tensions. The TPLF’s fate serves as a cautionary tale i.e. no ruling party, no matter how entrenched, is immune to collapse when it loses popular legitimacy. For now, the TPLF remains a relic of Ethiopia’s past—not its future.
TPLF’s rise and fall, demonstrates how its overreach, repression, and ultimate military defeat led to its current irrelevance. The TPLF’s era of dominance is over. Its future now depends on whether it can reinvent itself as a peaceful regional party or fade into obscurity as Ethiopia moves forward under new leadership.