Hager Wodad Los Angeles

The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), once Ethiopia’s most powerful political and military force, has suffered a dramatic decline since the death of its longtime leader, Meles Zenawi, in 2012. As the core of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition, the TPLF controlled Ethiopia’s security, economy, and political institutions for nearly three decades. However, a series of strategic blunders—internal divisions, military miscalculations, and diplomatic failures—have precipitated its current crisis, one largely of its own making. This essay examines how the TPLF’s failure to adapt, its authoritarian tendencies, reckless military decisions, and alienation of allies contributed to its self-inflicted downfall.

Leadership Crisis and Internal Fractures (2012–2018)

Meles Zenawi was a shrewd political operator who balanced competing factions within the TPLF while maintaining dominance over Ethiopia. His death in 2012 created a leadership vacuum that the party failed to fill effectively. His successor, Hailemariam Desalegn, a compromise figure from a smaller EPRDF member party, lacked Meles’ authority, leaving real power with the TPLF’s old guard. Instead of uniting, the TPLF fractured into rival factions: Hardliners, led by Debretsion Gebremichael, favored militarized control and resisted reforms. Reformists, including Getachew Reda and Abay Woldu, pushed for modernization and political compromise.The party’s internal purges—such as the sidelining of veterans like Sebhat Nega and Abay Tsehaye—further eroded cohesion. By 2018, the TPLF had become a shadow of its former self, clinging to power without a clear vision for Ethiopia’s future.

Miscalculations in Federal Politics

The TPLF fatally underestimated the Oromo protests (2014–2018), dismissing them as temporary unrest rather than a revolutionary movement. These protests, fueled by decades of marginalization, directly challenged TPLF dominance and paved the way for Abiy Ahmed’s rise in 2018.

When Abiy initiated reforms—freeing political prisoners, opening the economy—the TPLF saw him as a threat rather than an opportunity to negotiate a soft landing. Instead of adapting, it withdrew to Tigray, severed ties with the federal government, and refused to join the Prosperity Party. This strategic withdrawal transformed the TPLF from a national power broker into a regional rebel group, accelerating its decline.

The Catastrophic War (2020–2022)

In November 2020, the TPLF launched a preemptive strike on the Ethiopian National Defense Force’s (ENDF) Northern Command, seizing weapons and triggering a full-scale war. This decision rested on three fatal assumptions: 1) Ethiopia would quickly collapse under military pressure 2)Eritrea would not intervene decisively 3)The international community would side with Tigray. However, all three proved disastrously wrong.

After initial successes—retaking Mekelle in June 2021—the TPLF overplayed its hand by advancing toward Addis Ababa in late 2021. Instead of collapsing, federal forces mobilized mass recruits, Eritrea intensified attacks, and drone strikes crippled TPLF supply lines. By late 2022, the TPLF was forced into a humiliating surrender under the Pretoria Agreement. The war left hundreds of thousands dead, Tigray devastated, and the TPLF militarily broken.

The TPLF dismissed early African Union (AU) mediation efforts (2021–2022), believing military victory was possible. By the time it accepted negotiations, it had lost all leverage. Initially, the TPLF enjoyed strong Western sympathy due to reports of Ethiopian and Eritrean atrocities. However, its own war crimes—including massacres in Amhara and Axum—eroded international support. The U.S. and EU shifted focus to securing a ceasefire rather than backing Tigrayan independence. Regionally, the TPLF’s ties with Sudanese rebels angered Khartoum, which later supported Ethiopia. Its historic hostility with Eritrea ensured Isaias Afwerki’s determination to see the TPLF destroyed.

The Pretoria Agreement disarmed the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) and installed a Tigray Interim Administration (TIRA) under Getachew Reda. However, the TPLF infighting paralyzed governance. Debretsion’s faction undermined Getachew, leading to his ouster in 2024 and a return to hardline control. With the TDF weakened , Tigray became vulnerable to 1)Eritrean occupation in border areas.2)Amhara militia incursions in Welkait Tsegede 3)Public frustration erupted into protests across Southern Tigray (2024), while senior commanders defected—notably General Tsadkan Gebretensae, who formed the Movement of Tigrayans for Change. New political challengers, including Arena Tigray, Baytona, and SIMRET, further undermined TPLF legitimacy.

The war shattered Tigray’s economy, displacing millions and triggering famine-like conditions. Federal banking and trade restrictions persisted post-war, strangling recovery. Meanwhile, the Tigrayan diaspora, once a key source of funding and advocacy, grew disillusioned with the TPLF’s failed governance and warmongering. The TPLF’s decline was not inevitable; it was the product of arrogance, strategic blunders, and refusal to adapt. Today, Tigray stands at a crossroads. The emergence of General Tsadkan’s Movement of Tigrayans for Change—a coalition of former military leaders and opposition parties (ARENA, Tigray Independence Party, Baytona, and SIMRET)—marks the most significant challenge to TPLF rule in decades.

This movement gains momentum amid 1) Military fractures, including Tsadkan’s rejection of the TDF leadership’s allegiance to Debretsion and troop defections in Raya and Wejerat. 2) Civilian discontent, with protests forcing military retreats from areas like Korem.3) Brutal repression, including General Yohannes Woldegiorgis’ use of snipers in Mehoni and General Hintsa’s alleged executions in Abiy Adi. 4)Financial mismanagement, as Tsadkan accuses TPLF leaders of misappropriating billions while soldiers and civilians suffer 5)The Movement’s call for mass civil disobedience—declaring “Mekelle is ready” for change—echoes the revolutionary rhetoric the TPLF once wielded. Yet, in a bitter irony, the party now mirrors the repressive regimes it once fought, clinging to power through institutional control and security forces while alienating its base.

With Tsadkan warning of a “smoldering fire” of resistance and alleging Eritrean interference, Tigray faces either democratic transformation or violent escalation. Tigray’s tragedy is twofold: its people have been failed first by a federal government that waged a devastating war, and second by a TPLF leadership that restored authoritarian rule without delivering security or reconstruction. The rise of the Movement for Tigrayan Change reflects a growing demand for a third way—one that transcends both federal repression and the TPLF’s failed revanchism. Whether this movement can succeed where others have failed will determine whether Tigray’s future holds renewal or further ruin. Unless the TPLF embraces reform or steps aside, its legacy will be one of missed opportunities and unnecessary suffering.